


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
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
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
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FRICTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY

By COLONEL JOHN A. GORDON

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FRICTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY

by

John A. Gordon
Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Colonel George Allen

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

May 1986

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Friction in the Development of Arms Control Policy

AUTHOR: John A. Gordon, Colonel, USAF

Reviews the arms control policy and decision making process of the last several administrations with the emphasis on how frictional forces, not unlike those discussed by von Clausewitz, affect the process. Discusses friction within administrations, as a result of Congressional actions, from non-governmental organizations and from the media. Friction is present in every process involving individuals and organizations with differing views and objectives. It may not be desirable to remove all friction from the process, even if it were possible to do so, lest the decision makers stifle creativity and lose the benefit of a variety of views and approaches.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel John A. Gordon (M.S., Naval Postgraduate School, M.A., Highlands University) has been involved with the arms control process in his assignment as Director of Strategic Nuclear Affairs and later Deputy for Defense and Arms Control Affairs at the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. He has served as the Executive Assistant to the Undersecretary of the Air Force, and as a staff officer for MX in Air Force Research and Development in the Pentagon. He has had assignments with the Strategic Air Command with responsibilities in long-range planning, and with the Air Force Systems Command in material design and nuclear testing. Colonel Gordon also served as a Laboratory Associate at Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he participated in the design of the Mk-12A weapon system. Colonel Gordon is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1986.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The conduct of war resembles the workings of an intricate machine with tremendous friction, so that combinations which are easily planned on paper can be executed only with great effort. Consequently the commander's free will and intelligence find themselves hampered at every turn, and remarkable strength of mind and spirit are needed to overcome this resistance. Even then many good ideas are destroyed by friction, and we must carry out more simply and modestly what in more complicated form would have greater results.

Iron will-power can overcome this friction; it pulverizes every obstacle, but of course it wears down the machine as well.

But we should bear in mind that none of its (the military machine) components is of one piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his potential of friction....A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them go wrong.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1:17,119)

A central and well developed concept in von Clausewitz's On War is that of friction. Well studied by students of military history and force employment (for example, ref. 2), friction is one of the most pervasive and insidious forces operating on the battlefield, wasting considerable energy, "wearing down the machine" and injecting the element of chance and uncertainty into the outcome. Success requires that this friction be anticipated and planned for before the campaign.

The friction that Clausewitz describes in warfare has a strong analogy in the national security decision making process, with many of the same effects on national security. Friction hampers the commander's (in Chief's) free will, destroys many ideas, and wears down the policy machine. A. It is a subtle, pervasive

results in the loss of energy applied to do the work of the machine. Nowhere have frictional losses been so evident as in the development and execution of arms control policies.

The development of arms control policies and initiatives is influenced by a large and complex cast of characters, both within government and out. It is influenced by a dynamic international environment (especially in Europe where US INF deployments are underway and the Soviet propaganda effort is focused), a split within the Administration on the approach and the merits of "real" arms control and growing Congressional involvement in the foreign policy process. Also important is the growing influence of the media and non-governmental organizations.

Certainly no Administration since the advent of nuclear weapons has been immune from these frictional forces, but it would seem that during the Carter and Reagan years these forces have been stronger and the frictional losses to the system greater than in previous administrations. While the structure and style of the decision-making process under these two presidents differ greatly, both had to deal with strong disagreements within their administrations, vocal and involved Congresses, growing media attention, and pressure from external organizations.

To the extent that these forces detract from the pursuit of rational initiatives that are in our national interest, they represent a frictional loss to the nation, consuming energy, time, talent and abilities that could be better invested. There is evidence, for example, that there has been internal "sabotage" of White House decisions on initiatives in an attempt to change

the decisions or to diminish their effect. It may also be the case that the compromises made to appease diverse factions within an administration result in diffuse policies that lack internal consistency and prove to be "least common denominators" rather than sound and decisive actions. And finally, some arms control initiatives have been undertaken, at least in part, to ensure Congressional support of new weapons systems.

This paper will examine some of these frictional losses to the system of arms control policy making, with emphasis on the intra-administration differences and the impact of the Congress. At issue is whether these losses diminish our ability to make long-range, internally consistent arms control policies and diminish our ability to pursue the policies that are selected, or whether they are simply the "cost of doing business" in an open, democratic society.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES

It should come as no surprise that US arms control decision and policy making is complex, bureaucratically fragmented and divisive, poorly integrated with other national security issues and focused on the short-term to the near exclusion of long-term planning and policy making. Arms control is simply one aspect of national security and it follows that the arms control process mirrors the larger national security process. This process, in turn, is dictated largely by choices our nation has made over the years in response to our history and values and reflects concerns of the society as a whole. Lawrence Korb writes:

The major problems that decisionmakers face in planning our national security are largely inherent in our system of government and national character. These problems are also the result of the highly fragmented nature and problem-solving orientation of the present-day defense establishment. (3:139)

The separation of powers established by our Constitution has contributed significantly to this fractionation and the resulting friction: "The fear of tyranny and the separation of powers, upon which the Constitution is based, have no doubt militated against an effective, coherent national security policy." (3:139) Joseph Nye expands:

The American Constitution is based on an eighteenth-century liberal view that power is best controlled, not by centralizing and civilizing it, but by fragmentation and countervailing checks and balances. In the area of foreign policy, the Constitution establishes (an) open "invitation to struggle" for control by the executive and legislative branches.... (4:3)

While the Constitution assigns responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy to the executive, in practice the boundaries of responsibilities overlap and one cannot function effectively without the other. Indeed, the distinction between foreign policy, defense, and the budget is difficult if not impossible to draw.

But the competing pulls in the arms control process have many other sources as well. The special interest groups that make up the American public are having a greater and greater influence on the process as the government is forced to recognize the claims of single-interest groups. The effect and impact of these groups are magnified by the "almost constitutionally entrenched role of the press as a virtual fourth branch of government." (4:3) Other factors include the rapid changeover of the entire House of Representatives every two years, the relative weakness and lack of discipline of the national political parties, the large turnover of bureaucrats every time the president changes, and the widening swings in the goals of the conservative and liberal elements in the political process.

In large measure we have come to accept the frictional losses to defense and foreign policy that result from Congressional and public involvement in the policy process. We forget that much of this is due to the rapid shifts that result every two and four years and the even shorter swings in public opinion that result from changes in world situations and the media's reporting of these events. After all, these are constitutionally based. What the public and press have difficulty accepting and

understanding, however, are problems of leadership, teamwork and consistency within the executive branch itself. While the executive decision structure flows from a blueprint laid out by the Constitution, its sheer size makes decision making extraordinarily difficult and cumbersome.

The number of people currently involved in the decision-making process not only has ceased to aid policy making, but has, in fact, slowed the process. The creation of numerous departments within the government and a plurality of agencies, committees, and interdepartmental "coordinating groups" has "clogged the system" and made policy formulation more difficult. The issues that arise rarely affect only one group of people and cannot be considered the exclusive domain of one organization or department. The result is obvious; not only is there disagreement within an organization, but each organization holds different, often conflicting views on a single issue. (3:140)

This intra-administration divisiveness and competition have been well-publicized characteristics of the last several administrations. A more subtle, but potentially more serious problem has been the lack of consistency in our foreign policy and a lack of integration of the various elements of policy that comprise our overall policy and support our national interests and goals. In part, concerns over consistency and integration led to the creation of the National Security Council.

The aim of this council, at least for a number of its promoters, was to constrain both the permanent agencies and the president by linking them to one another, through the persons of the cabinet members who would sit on the council as the president's senior advisors. Policy would thus be both stabilized and integrated. (5:575)

The following chapters look beyond these general observations to how friction has affected the development and implementation of arms control policy.

CHAPTER III

FRICTION WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The Early Years

There seems always to have been tension and uncertainty in who, below the level of the president, has primary responsibility for developing and implementing national security policy. Prior to the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947 there was no formal mechanism to coordinate and integrate the activities of the various agencies in the executive branch, particularly State and Defense, and no institution to promote continuity and coherence in national security policy. The NSC was envisioned to serve such a role by institutionalizing a formal, interagency policy process. It, along with the position of national security adviser (first established by Eisenhower) has had varying degrees of success and was used in a wide range of ways as suited the president then in office.

Truman envisioned the NSC staff to be made up of career professionals of "neutral competence." Eisenhower generally continued the neutral, professional staff, but had the first national security adviser, a political appointee. I. M. Drestler reports that despite the establishment of this position, the formal system became a cumbersome papermill, largely irrelevant to the actual policy decisions made by Eisenhower. (5:578)

Under Kennedy, there was a strong and active NSC staff led by McGeorge Bundy. While Kennedy's intent was for the staff to function as a facilitator to make the system work and not to be a major force in and of itself, a talented and aggressive staff was

asked to provide independent judgment to the president. That in turn "put the slower moving State Department (or any established organization) somewhat in the shade." With a relatively weak staff at State, the effect was that power was pulled away from the agencies and into the White House; the President had special confidence in people on his immediate staff and often found it easier for Bundy to take the policy lead. (5:579-580)

Under Johnson, even though he inherited the Kennedy system, the role of national security adviser and the NSC staff was reduced to a bare minimum, performing mainly day-to-day functions. "As [the Kennedy] players left to be replaced by others, informal mechanisms and contacts were used for military strategy and other decisionmaking." (6:13)

The most remarkable and most powerful use of the NSC occurred under Nixon with Henry Kissinger as the nearly omnipotent national security adviser; he became the senior foreign policy initiator and advocate, eclipsing the secretaries of state and defense. Tensions were greatest in State as Kissinger took to the White House many of the functions the Department had long held to itself. That said, and despite the resulting friction among the most senior members of the cabinet, reports are that many at lower levels in the administration found the process to be acceptable since decisions were being made and implemented in a timely fashion and the bureaucracy knew where to "weigh-in". (5:580)

Ford appointed Brent Scowcroft who immediately shunned the high visibility, high profile role of Kissinger for the more traditional role of private adviser to the president. Breather

notes that Kissinger, now at State, maintained his policy dominance and thus effectively kept Scowcroft's role from growing. (5:581)

The Carter Years

There are mixed views on how Carter initially planned to organize his arms control policy making apparatus. Authors Drestler and W. P. Bundy (5 and 7) seem to agree that Carter came to the presidency with plans to reverse many of the ways of doing business in the past, "committed to cabinet government, openness and decentralization." (5:581) Apparently Carter and his aides had negative reactions to the extremely strong and singular power that had been vested in Kissinger. That said, Carter himself had strong foreign policy and arms control views and planned to take a far more active and aggressive personal interest in these issues.

Bundy (7) believes that the Carter administration actually intended to return to the Truman/Kennedy model of decision making with the cabinet members as the principal advisers and the NSC more as a facilitator in a cabinet government style. The State Department was to be the overall leader and indeed early on Secretary Vance did seem to hold the upper hand in the bureaucracy. And certainly, with rare exceptions, Brzezinski was not a direct participant in negotiations. However, Carter's own style and personal involvement in arms control brought the NSC in as an active player, but created extreme tensions among his statutory advisers -- the secretaries of state and defense and the JCS:

... the Administration's first approach to the Soviets on SALT II was peculiarly hasty and ill-coordinated, and in the face of evident policy tensions between Secretary Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski -- and with a President who was inexperienced, impetuous, and capable of reversing himself even on carefully developed lines of action... -- the administration never developed a coherent or mature operating style or method of interaction among its senior officials.... [I]t is unlikely that historians or future practitioners of foreign policy will find the Carter administration anything but a negative example of method and process. (7:104)

Drestler comes to the same basic conclusion: "The result of all this has been a foreign-policy making system that has never developed a clear, coherent pattern." (5:581) However, he sees more of a mistake at the very beginning: the selection was for a national security adviser who was "not a manager content to remain in the shadows, but an ambitious, highly visible policy thinker...." Brzezinski himself selected an active, committed and aggressive NSC staff with strong views, at, in Drestler's view, "the cost of professional competence and experience in the management of policy." Because of this, advisers felt isolated from the process:

The senior military staff officers early in the Carter administration were apparently unhappy not just with the substance of some early Carter decisions but with the way he made them. They felt excluded from advisory contact. (5:584)

Somewhat surprisingly, lower level staffs do not report personally experiencing this conflict or isolation from the process. Interagency groups (assistant secretary level) were chaired by the NSC and working groups by the State Department. Participants at these levels generally report an orderly process. They felt involved with the SALT process on a continuing basis.

and believed their views were considered before decisions were made. Group members tell that the issues that were staffed were completed in a disciplined process and that when decision papers were sent into the White House, decisions were prompt and were usually one of the specific options presented. Contrast this to the Reagan process discussed later where decisions were often an amalgamation of the various options presented. (8 and 9)

Carter apparently recognized many of the deficiencies of his decision making process and a study of national security policy integration began in March of 1979, led by Phillip Odeen. (10) Interestingly, friction is apparent even in the conduct of the study. Brzezinski and OSD strongly opposed even beginning the study, while the Chiefs, State, and ACDA were strongly in favor of it. Both State and ACDA saw it as a means to increase their influence in key defense issues and to better integrate SALT and arms control in general with defense programs. (11:6-7)

The Odeen report found shortcomings with the NSC structure: an absence of structures for integrating arms control and foreign policies with those of defense, poor management of the staff, uneven quality of staff analyses, and a failure to clearly communicate presidential decisions out to the bureaucracy. In commenting on the report, writers Baruch and Clarke note that the informal process was also defective -- although there were breakfast meetings between Vance, Brown and Brzezinski, staff generally was not present and notes not taken. (10:8)

While there were a large number of recommendations made in the study which was approved by the president, only one related to improving the NSC was implemented: the appointment of an NSC

coordinator for defense matters. (This position was continued, successfully, in the Reagan NSC.) But, according to Baruch and Clarke, Air Force Major General Jasper Welch did not succeed in upgrading the NSC staff's handling of defense matters. Perhaps more importantly, the recommendations for greater State/ACDA involvement in defense issues bearing directly upon arms control and foreign policy never materialized. This friction seemed to reach a high when Carter's new Secretary of State, Senator Edmund Muskie, found it necessary to go public in an election year with the charge that he was cut out of key decisions. (10:11-13)

The Reagan Administration

President Reagan began with apparently the same intent as President Carter, to return to the less direct policy development and advocacy role for the NSC staff and national security adviser, as was practiced under Truman and Kennedy. He wanted a relatively pure form of cabinet government and expected to rely heavily on his secretaries of state and defense to develop policy initiatives and to implement them. The two secretaries were strong and opinionated and immediately took the reins in their own hands. The NSC staff was under National Security Adviser Richard Allen who also professed an interest to keep in the background and allow the policy initiatives to come from the cabinet. Despite this, things got off to a rocky start. Baruch and Clarke report that the lack of an early settled foreign policy by the President "contributed to confused lines of authority and strained relations among senior officials." And commenting on the early structure of senior interagency groups:

These committees functioned poorly in 1981, partly because the IGs [Interagency Groups] proliferated without unifying design and often met with undefined agendas, but primarily because of the lack of a clear, constant, centralized authority with both the power and ability to coordinate policy.

Despite the President's initial assertion that he would rely heavily on the secretary of state and the State Department for the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, this was not a State-centered system. Neither Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger nor other senior officials would accept this, and for an understandable reason: the State Department is not, cannot, and should not be a neutral arbiter of interagency disputes. (11:17-18)

Yet this was exactly what the State Department was asked to do: to chair interagency meetings, to resolve disputes whenever possible, and to prepare decision papers for the president. This put State in the untenable position of having to both advocate its own position, resolve differences, and where differences remained, to attempt to prepare neutral and well-balanced decision papers for the White House, adequately and accurately presenting the various opinions. Military personnel attached to the Bureau of Politico-Military affairs attempted to provide some balance to the process and prepare the necessary decision papers, but the differences proved too deep and the friction and conflict between both principals and staffs too great for a smooth operation.

The resulting bureaucratic battles between agencies, notably State and Defense, over the US approach to arms control negotiations have been well documented and seem to be the most well-known feature of the arms control process. (See, for example, references 12-14.) While such works as Talbot's 13011 Gambits (14) considerably over-dramatize the internal divisions and conflicts, the "battles of the two Richards" -- Richard

at State and Richard Perle at Defense -- was a real feature of the interagency process. But these battles were only symptomatic of a deeper problem.

While little of significance for arms control took place early in the administration, the format of the decision making-process was defined: the State Department had the lead on general foreign policy issues while Defense was to lead on defense policy questions; the NSC staff and the security adviser were to provide for integration of plans and policies between conflicting issues and iron out policy differences. Unfortunately, serious tensions developed immediately between the two secretaries and their staffs. Allen, who found himself under public criticism very early on, never established a mechanism to resolve differences smoothly or to control the internal conflicts.

Examples abound of these early difficulties:

Central coordination of policy in 1981 was either ad hoc or nonexistent. At times, decisions were so tightly held among the president and his political advisers that they were made without adequate staff work or the presence of those with pertinent expertise.... At other times the process was so loose that senior officials disputed one another in public.... Preparations for White House meetings were often shoddy.... Following [NSC] meetings, subordinates were usually denied access to memorandums on decisions taken, which contributed to great uncertainty about precisely what had occurred....

Nor was any individual or mechanism charged with integrating overall arms control, defense, and foreign policy. Weinberger, who enjoyed easy access to the president, kept State and ACDA out of almost all major defense budget decisions, including those affecting the future of strategic forces. Weinberger was indifferent about the ABM Treaty and cool toward arms control generally. He spoke freely on foreign policy questions and made decisions with virtually no input from State or ACDA, on such matters as the deployment of sea-launched cruise missiles, an issue of great consequence for arms negotiations and U.S.-NATO relations. (11:19-20)

These problems were recognized by many and attempts were made to improve the process. Allen was replaced by Clark who was a close personal friend of the President and he set out to strengthen the role of the NSC staff. Yet many considered the staff too small and too ideological and worried about Clark's lack of experience. Indeed the actual result of the change was small and "DOD's broad mandate over defense policies, including some that affected arms control and foreign policy issues, was largely unchallenged." (11:19) This seemingly contributed to Haig's resignation as secretary of state in June of 1982.

Despite these senior level changes, the internal battles continued, and while the personal differences between Weinberger and Haig were no longer a facet of arms control decisions, the inter-department differences were as great as ever. W. P. Bundy (7:104) characterizes the differences between the two departments as "pragmatists versus ideologues" and "multilateralists versus unilateralists". Where often one would expect the professional staffs to work out various differences, this simply could not be done with the interagency differences as great as they were. As a result, Judge Clark established another group, then called the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG), made up of selected individuals from the relevant agencies to discuss the issues at a high level, but below that of the president, in an attempt to remove some of the personalities from the process, to have the issues discussed privately, and to give top-level guidance down to the staffs.

This group has had mixed results. By bringing the problems

together in the privacy of the White House situation room, it removed staff biases and avoided the necessity for players to support positions for the benefit of their staffs. But it did not result in appreciably fewer issues going to the President for resolution. At the same time, staffs felt even more isolated from the process and this exacerbated the differences and frictions at these lower levels.

In general, the interagency system, with or without the SACPG, was not able to make decisions -- the differences were just too great. The result was that more and more issues went to the White House for decision. Even then the results were not very satisfying. With few exceptions, the departments felt that the resulting decisions were not clear cut and did not reflect consistent approaches to the Soviets. Rather, the impression was that often a new, composite position would be crafted by the NSC staff that combined parts of various agency positions so that each department could claim victory. Alternately, one department "won" once, and then it would be another's turn. In any event, the process could not have been more cumbersome and few players could have been less happy.

The reasons for this fuzzy state of affairs can be traced to several things. First, the administration was, and arguably still is, without a clear idea on its overall arms control objectives. This has led to the natural bureaucratic and political fights that develop when widely different views on how to proceed are held by very strong individuals in powerful positions. While this should not surprise us, what has made the fights so visible publicly are the principals' willingness to "go

public" to help sway a decision or to help reverse one contrary to their original position. What is so remarkable about Strobe Talbot's book on the Reagan arms control activities (Deadly Gambits, ref 14) is not the substance of the book, but that so many people from within the administration were willing to talk to him in such detail. The concepts of teamwork and of implementing a decision by the president, even if it is contrary to one's advice, seem sorely lacking in the administration.

And, of course, one thing that distinguishes this administration from the past is the personal involvement of the president. President Carter had his arms control agenda clearly in mind and spent a great proportion of his time on its development and its implementation. It's not that there were no disagreements within the Carter administration, there certainly were. But his personal involvement seemed to constrain the power of his advisers and imposed a discipline not seen in the Reagan administration. A reasonable question is whether this approach also stifled advice and creativity.

On the other hand, President Reagan has chosen to live with a cabinet government in a truer sense of the word, seeking the diverse advice of his many advisers. The question here is whether this approach destroys teamwork and the ability to implement policies.

CHAPTER IV

FRICTION AND THE CONGRESS

Friction within the executive branch has been a favorite topic of arms control observers, especially during the past two administrations where there have been so many well-publicized disagreements, resignations and public disputes. But the executive branch does not have a monopoly on friction. This chapter deals with friction as a result of Congressional involvement in the arms control policy process.

As a reminder, we are not talking about friction in the simple sense of arguments or disagreements, rather the focus is on frictional losses -- when those disagreements or activities result in loss of energy or direction to an established national objective. These losses can take the form of wasted individual energies, confused or poorly directed policies, lack of a single approach, or giving advantages to the negotiating partner.

Interestingly, friction in US arms control policy arising from Congressional involvement is a fairly new phenomenon. Until recently the executive has been largely left alone to make and execute arms control policies and conclude treaties, seeking only a pro forma, after the fact, endorsement by the Senate. No more. Members of both houses take an active role, analyzing, criticizing, offering new approaches and negotiating proposals of their own and, occasionally, supporting the president. Many members and staff now have a degree of expertise in arms control. And, importantly, arms control is of sufficient visibility to the public that it can be an important electoral issue.

Alan Platt (14:1x) attributes this greater involvement of the Congress, to "the executive branch's loss of credibility in pursuing a highly unpopular war in Indochina, and the events surrounding President Nixon's 1974 resignation from office." While this may be too simplistic an explanation, there is no question that arms control is no longer the exclusive domain of the president, and that it is directly influenced by forces outside of the administration.

Platt points out that the era for Congressional involvement in arms control began with the one-vote margin of approval for the deployment of the ABM system in 1969. This vote culminated a five-week debate which to many was the first time the Congress had played a major role in the making of national security policy.

Congress had generally been content with pro forma evaluation of the executive's annual defense requests, save for an occasional increase in appropriations for a particular weapons system and a still more occasional marginal cut in the Pentagon's annual budget in the name of fiscal prudence.

The 1969 ABM debate led many members of Congress to believe that henceforth they would play a consistently more active role in formulating arms control policies. No longer, many felt, would executive spokesmen be able to testify behind closed doors before docilely supportive committees. No longer would members of Congress and their staffs lack the knowledge to discuss strategic doctrine and weapons policies. No longer would the executive be the sole source of technical information on complex military matters. (15:2-3)

Platt notes that the influence of the Congress in arms control can be felt in both weapon policy and in the foreign policy process itself. Certainly congressional activity related to weapons expenditures has increased drastically since 1969. Research shows significant increases in the amount of time

invested by members in hearings on weapon systems, the number of hearings and witnesses, the number and educational level of congressional staffs dedicated to defense, and even the number of committees overseeing the programs. Also, Congress has been strengthening its own research units, the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Office. (15:5-7)

In foreign policy and arms control, the Congress had little impact until the SALT II debate. Up until the SALT II:

the pattern of executive-legislative relations has been the same: the executive has formulated the national negotiating posture; informed and consulted with Congress very selectively, most closely after a treaty has been concluded; and, while the negotiations were in progress expected and received legislative support. The Congress, for its part, made little effort ... to analyze, debate, or explore alternative policies. Congress was most actively involved in these arms negotiations after it was called upon to ratify an already concluded treaty. Typically most members of the Senate and House opted not even to inform themselves about the precise issues under discussion during the negotiations themselves. (15:6-7)

There was a brief flurry of congressional/legislative interaction at the conclusion of SALT I when Senator Jackson led the fight for an amendment which would prohibit future negotiations from limiting the US to levels inferior to Soviet forces. However, until SALT II neared conclusion and was later submitted to the Senate for advice and consent by President Carter, the executive branch dominated the process. Although there was a greater degree of Congressional consultations during the extended SALT II negotiations and the appointment of a number of members of the House and Senate as advisers who could attend negotiating sessions in Geneva, President Carter kept a tight control of the issues and of alternative approaches until near

the end. (9:95) However, as the negotiations stretched on and on, and more and more about the treaty became public knowledge, the Carter administration began worrying about ratification and began working more closely with members. But by then the situation had gotten out of hand. "SALT was such a copious grab bag of political and military problems that there was something for almost every senator and representative who wanted to play a part." (9:207)

This tight control of arms control policy making seems to stem from the Kissinger system. Pratt reports that under this closed system, even "the shape of the issues under discussion was kept from much of the government, including most of the executive branch and usually all of Congress." This system, designed primarily to preclude leaks, permitted only the most basic consultations with a few committees, a refusal to share US proposals with Congress, failure to keep them informed of changes, and discouragement of Congressional debate on either US or Soviet proposals. It would seem that this tight system also sowed the seeds for a backlash and the considerable involvement of the Congress we see today. Certainly much of this was the fault of Congress itself. Had members taken tougher stands the information could have been made available to them, but many felt that it was not in their charter, that they did not have adequate staff or knowledge, that consultations during ratification were sufficient, and "virtually no member of Congress felt compelling constituent pressure to play a more active role in formulating arms negotiations policy". (15:13)

The other event that catalyzed the level of Congressional

Involvement we see today was the divisive Congressional debate over the ratification of SALT II. The conservatives challenged the treaty and proposed numerous fixes; the Senate Armed Services Committee, without jurisdiction for the treaty, found it not to be in our national interest. While the treaty was eventually withdrawn, that debate energized the Congress to take an active and continuing role in the formulation of arms control policy. It seems ironic that the conservatives who challenged SALT II and set the stage for an active Congress must now live with a more liberal Congress that has assumed an important policy role during this conservative administration.

While the end of the Carter administration saw a considerable increase in the level and effectiveness of Congressional involvement directly in the arms control process, that seen by the Reagan administration is even greater. During this period we have seen individual members formulate and publicize their own negotiating proposals (most notably Cohen and Gore, see ref 16), visits to Moscow by Congressional delegations to discuss arms control, debates in both houses on specific elements of US negotiating positions, and, for the first time, the direct linking of Congressional support for a weapon program (the MX) to a specific arms control initiative.

There are several reasons for this increased involvement during the Reagan administration. The conservatives in the Congress during the Carter years left a legacy for active involvement. Their opposition to SALT II helped create a precedent for greater involvement while the highly polarized, public debate helped lift arms control to a political visibility

where it can swing elections. No longer can a member plead ignorance of arms control or express his confidence in the executive. The SALT II experience also left a major rift among political bedfellows on what is the proper course for the nation, widening the traditional conservative-liberal split.

The Reagan administration got off to a slow start on arms control, preferring to begin the long-overdue modernization program and using that as a foundation for the negotiations to follow. This created an opening for more liberal arms control advocates to criticize and to have their voice heard. Hard-core politics also came into play when the Democrats saw a opening for political hay: the failure of the Reagan administration to pursue arms control. When arms proposals were formulated and negotiations begun, critics found the US negotiating position to be particularly tough and unlikely, in their view, to result in an agreement. They found US positions to be "non-negotiable." And finally, we find members of the administration going to Congress to help with their intra-administration battles. Thus we find Congress predisposed to become heavily involved in arms control and the administration's actions doing little to discourage that involvement.

The most obvious example of that involvement came with the inclusion of a Congressionally developed proposal into the US START position in exchange for continued, albeit reduced, support for the MX missile. In January 1983, Senator Cohen proposed a formula for strategic arms control where a side would reduce two older nuclear weapons for each new weapon deployed. This concept got some immediate support from President Reagan and the

Interagency groups began a detailed study of the concept now called "build-down." While there was no visible support for the concept in any of the interagency staffs, in one of their rare moments of full agreement, the White House sought a formulation that would help with Congressional support for the MX.

During the summer of 1983, Congressional opposition to both the established US negotiating position and to MX continued to grow. The votes for deployment of the initial 10 MX passed by only the slimmest of margins and only after considerable political pressure from the White House. Many members regard the vote as "a referendum on the Administration's pledge to reform its arms control proposals." (17:1624) Senator Cohen is quoted as saying that Congress' support for MX was "our part of an agreement with the Administration to proceed with a militarily controversial program in exchange for a strong commitment to proceed seriously and immediately with a reformulation of the US START proposal." (17:1624) At the same time, Congressman Aspin formulated an amendment to the FY1984 Defense Authorization Bill linking deployment of the MX to the development of a new single-warhead ICBM. This new missile would also require adjustments to US arms control proposals already on the table. These cases are indicative of the severe gap that had opened between the Congress and the executive over arms control and defense spending.

The President's response was to attempt to close this gap and to bring some bipartisanship back into the process. The establishment of the Scowcroft Commission to examine the strategic modernization program was a key step. The Commission

found considerable merit in the proposal for a single-warhead missile, and forged a link between modernization of strategic forces and arms control. (18) Even more important politically was the President's willingness to incorporate the basic concept of build-down into the US negotiating position. This position was not taken easily by the President's advisers who found little of merit in the proposal, expected it to complicate the already difficult negotiations, and expected the Soviets to immediately reject it. Nevertheless, the important precedent of this step cannot be overstated: "...President Reagan let a group of Congressmen take the lead in fashioning an imaginative initiative of their own." (17:16)

Although agreement was reached between the White House and Congress, Congressional members did not trust the US negotiators to present it fairly to the Soviets. Congressman Gore wrote:

My first concern was that the Administration might renege on its end of the bargain: that if we once produced the necessary margin of victory in Congress, it would take the MX money and run. In the end, the president respected his commitments. But there was still plenty of trouble, since at every level below the president one could find disgruntled officials, hostile to this approach and not subject to any real discipline from the White House. (20:7)

One of the results of this distrust was the appointment of Jim Woolsey, a Democrat and member of the Scowcroft Commission as a member at-large of the negotiating team (the Reagan administration did not continue the Carter practice of allowing congressional advisers to join negotiating sessions in Geneva). Congressman Aspin is reported to have said that "If Ed Rowny [the US negotiator and an opponent of build-down] came back and said

... build-down won't fly, I wouldn't believe him. But I trust Jim Woolsey to give it a real try". (19:18)

It is impossible to quantify the frictional losses due to this increased involvement of the Congress in the actual negotiating process, but there are certainly losses. For example, the interagency system basically stopped all work on the continued development of positions and tactics for nine months in 1983 while it wrestled with and modified Senator Cohen's build-down ideas. From the viewpoint of the conservatives, build-down was contrary to their entire approach to the negotiations and it injected a new element into the negotiations before the Soviets had even responded to earlier US proposals. They felt it would further confuse the already complex proposals on the table for a concept that military analysis had shown would have negative impacts on US forces. (The US was just beginning its strategic modernization program while the Soviets were well along.) In effect, many conservatives viewed it as another liberal "arms control at any price" scheme. As it turned out, the Soviets did reject build-down almost as soon as it was proposed.

But there were gains as well as frictional losses with build-down. Time reports that:

Reagan was amply rewarded for not standing on presidential prerogative. In the first place, he secured congressional backing for the MX missile. He is also able to present Moscow with a START proposal that enjoys strong bipartisan support. (19:16)

In effect, the adoption of build-down and its incorporation into the US negotiating position bridged the gap between the administration and the Congress that had been long brewing. For

their part the Congress publicly and privately (to the Soviets) indicated their strong support of the President. How long this holds remains to be seen. Also, one must wonder how long the commitment to MX will last -- for good or bad, this is one weapon now inextricably linked to the negotiations in Geneva.

CHAPTER V

OTHER SOURCES OF FRICTION

In examining decision making in arms control, the focus is rightly on the executive branch and the Congress. They have constitutional and statutory arms control responsibilities, are generally very active in its pursuit and their actions can have great effect. But increasingly, a variety of academic and private organizations, along with the media and the public, are exerting a considerable influence on arms control decisions and actions within the government.

However, since these organizations trade in influence and public perceptions, the magnitude of their effect on the policy process is impossible to quantify. And, from the perspective of this paper, the friction they inject into the arms control policy process is equally difficult to measure. That there are frictional losses -- lost energy, time and focus -- is undeniable. Some of these groups are relatively large, have a high public profile, and create constituent responses, and thus require "servicing" both by members of the Congress and the administration. What is debatable is the extent to which these groups have had a positive impact on the process (which of course also depends on one's perspective about how well or poorly an administration is pursuing arms control).

Academic Institutions

Somewhat surprisingly, there is no evidence of academic groups having a strong degree of influence in arms control. While there are numerous institutions that analyze and comment on arms control and offer in their journals a variety of alternative approaches, these institutions are seldom active or influential in the policy debates. Lawrence Weiler notes that "... funding and faculty resources do not permit a concentrated focus by several scholars on a given arms control area, let alone the "luxury" of entering significantly into current policy debates."

That said, Weiler goes on to note a more subtle influence of academic institutions on arms control:

The contribution that the existing centers have made in strengthening the academic infrastructure and adding significantly to the training of young professionals in the field cannot be underestimated. [sic] This will, in turn, enrich the future capacity for more informed participation by the beneficiaries of that contribution, as academicians, congressional staffers or executive branch professionals.
(11:39-49)

Weiler approaches the issue of academic involvement as one who clearly believes that the professional arms controller should play a much greater role in the development of national policy, and implies that there will be a net benefit to the country when these many trained professionals occupy important and influential government positions. This is not an obvious conclusion, and those that question the direction and pace of past arms control efforts may argue with it, countering with the argument that we need more experts in the broad field of national security, not in the subset of arms control. They would argue that as more arms

control "experts" move into positions of influence, there would be greater pressure to conclude arms control agreements even if they were not in our national interest.

Another phenomenon that occurs with academic institutions is that they become a haven for members of the arms control community of the administration not currently in power. In these positions they have a forum to criticize, publish and prepare for the future. But in most cases they are not well funded and not well heard except by a few members of Congress with similar political leanings. "As noted earlier, to the extent that there is an academic influence on current decision options, it is through individual efforts and not because of institutional activities or support." (11:39) For these reasons it is hard to identify frictional losses from the academic side of arms control, simply because they have not played a major role in the framing or the debate of the critical issues. Nor, for the same reasons, is it apparent that they have made significant positive contributions.

Non-Governmental Organizations

Privately supported non-governmental organizations, however, are another case. Over the past several years, a number of these organizations have had considerable influence on specific decisions by offering well-defined proposals, publicizing them and organizing large and effective public awareness campaigns. That they contribute to friction and result in frictional losses depends, like the cases before this, on the perspective of the observer. Certainly an administration which must spend considerable time and effort blunting a proposal pushed by an outside

organization must view the losses as frictional, for this effort consumes valuable and limited resources and deflects attention from other goals. Others, when they see a shift in policy to accommodate the power generated by an "outside" organization, see the influence as a positive gain. Weiler writes:

The public is usually passive, but, on occasion, it can and has been energized. In this context, the role of NGOs [non-governmental organizations] and what they are or are not able to accomplish should rightfully be regarded as not merely significant, but central, to the U.S. decisionmaking process. (11:41)

A lengthy history of non-governmental organizations and their role in the arms control process is not necessary, but a few examples illustrate their importance and their influence. These groups fall into one of three categories:

- (a) long-standing, professionally managed groups whose purpose is mainly to provide a continuing body of knowledge and expertise and make it available to the Congress and the media. The Arms Control Association, a good example of this category. They have long provided briefings for interested groups, a forum for the professional arms control community, and a body of knowledge useful for others to become involved in the policy process. Although they represent the view of the professional arms controllers, they are not, and never intended to be, a mass-membership organization nor are they interested in conducting major political campaigns.
- (b) long-standing, highly active, direct political action groups representing a specific group of people. The Council for a Liveable World is an example. They are active in specific

political issues, attempt to influence policy directly, and become actively involved in the elections of specific Congressional candidates.

- (c) grass-roots organizations which come and go with specific issues. The Nuclear Freeze Campaign is the most effective and well known of this type of organization.

The work of this last organization generated extremely wide-spread and intense publicity for a nuclear freeze, and the supporting resolutions introduced in both houses of Congress were debated long and passionately. That they had a strong influence on the administration is undeniable. A major public campaign was conducted to explain to the American people why the administration viewed the freeze as unworkable and contrary to their arms control approach. The Nuclear Freeze Campaign conducted such an aggressive campaign and generated so much public attention that it could not be ignored.

An example of a group that has not had much effect is the Physicians for Social Responsibility. Even though they have won a Nobel Peace Prize, they are not a powerful force -- they simply do not represent enough political power to be reckoned with. On the other hand, the National Council of Catholic Bishops is a group which has had an effect. The preparation of a Pastoral letter questioning the morality of nuclear deterrence forced the administration to go to considerable effort to work with the Bishops to explain the administration policies and approaches toward arms control and deterrence and to offset the publicity generated by the bishop's letter. (21)

The impact of non-governmental organizations on the policy process can be very real, but it generally has proved short lived. This is probably because of the single-issue focus of the various groups and their inability to hold the attention of the American people, or the Congress, for long periods of time. Weiler notes that "any substantial effect on policy cannot rest on the political leverage of their own membership. What has been required is the energy and ability to stimulate the general public, often through unaffiliated local organizations and news media". (11:44)

The groups discussed above, and their kin, generally can be classified as being in the liberal camp. It seems that one phenomena of American life is that the conservatives, and the moderates, have been unsuccessful in organizing support groups of this nature. We can find a few, such as the Committee on the Present Danger, but this is a small, intellectual group with narrow interests. An interesting topic for analysis is whether this is a real phenomenon (are conservatives less willing to organize and stick together when not in political power) or an artifact of the liberal bent of the media which gives so little coverage of conservative groups that they cannot thrive.

Media and the Public

The subject of how the media and the public influence or control policy is closely related to the previous section on non-governmental institutions. Such groups need a large public following to have real influence on the process of the policy and must have the media to get their message to the public. And

like the above groups, the influence of the media and the public is hard to quantify. On one hand, it is easy to criticize the media as being biased in their treatment of arms control and nuclear weapon issues. One-sided reporting that generates a public response certainly results in frictional losses in that it requires significant effort by the government to attempt to counter (often unsuccessfully) and can even have an effect on how the Soviets posture and respond during the negotiations. On the other hand, it is difficult to criticize the public's right to know or their right to influence the process.

But public opinion, even when energized by the press and effective non-governmental groups, is short lived. Writing from a position that the media have a vital role in the nuclear process, Robert Ehrlich notes that:

Current public opinion research offers further grounds for skepticism that public opinion has had a major influence on the determination of national policy to date, except in limited and indirect ways. Despite such findings, however, a gradual evolution in public opinion over time can have a profound effect on the political complexion of the elected policy-makers, and it can also place constraints on their policy choices. (22:39)

Ehrlich gives several reasons for "poor media coverage of nuclear issues" (22:39-44):

- o Lack of Knowledge. No one, including the media, know much of nuclear war.
- o Sports mentality. There is too much emphasis on keeping score and on who is ahead, thus portraying the nuclear balance too simplistically and one dimensionally.
- o Ill-defined terms. The debates and discussions are

Imprecise and often become matters of semantics rather than substance.

- o Educational differences. The American public is "woefully lacking" in scientific matters and too few can understand the issues involved.
- o Contamination by association. It is often easier, and a characteristic of the media, to attack a view which differs from their own by undermining the credibility of the more extreme supporters of that view, rather than addressing the issue directly.
- o False dichotomies. Nuclear issues are often presented as two-sided, when in reality they are multi-dimensional and have many shades. Similarly, news is more exciting when two panellists with diametrically opposing views are interviewed rather than presenting a dispassionate evaluation of an issue.

Finally Ehrlich comments on the question of whether the Soviets have been able to manipulate western public opinion through the skillful use of the media. While concluding that the Soviets have not been successful in influencing the American public (a conclusion with which some would differ), he points out that they have an aggressive campaign to do so: "There is, in fact, a department of the Soviet KGB specifically charged with subversion of western media--an effort on which the Soviets spend an estimated \$3 billion to \$4 billion." (22:43)

The West, of course, does not have an opportunity to influence the Soviet public, while the Soviets can enhance their

image as peacemakers and make us appear as the intransigents in the arms control process.

Alan Platt might well agree that the public has generally not been influential in the arms control process, but he finds at least one example of significant influence. He argues that public perceptions were in large measure responsible for the failure of SALT II, as popular support for the treaty dropped to less than 43% by September 1979 from a high of 72% that same April. (23:4) He points out that public confidence began to fall early in the Carter administration with the appointment of Paul Warnke and went down hill as the negotiations dragged on and secrecy remained tight.

In looking to the future, Platt prescribes:

Extreme presidential secrecy and noninvolvement--however attractive for reasons of negotiations, personal operating style, or foreign relations--are likely to prove self defeating. Among other things, the president could and should seize the early opportunities to shape the terms of the public debate.

... It is not sufficient to begin the effort to sell the emerging treaty to the Congress and the American people only after the accord is formally submitted to the legislative branch for approval. The campaign must be planned and appropriately implemented long before a treaty is formally concluded. (23:22,23)

With this, we are still left with the question of whether these effects are friction in the arms control process. Certainly President Carter and his SALT advisers would see the loss of the treaty to such forces as friction. However, it is unlikely the opponents of SALT II would characterize the public and press influence as friction. The prescription suggested by Alan Platt to shape a public debate about any treaty well in

advance of its conclusion would consume considerable resources and energy. Is that friction, or is it the oil to reduce the friction which plagued SALT II?

In our society it is hard to cast involvement and influence of the American people in a process so vital as national security in a negative fashion. So while these effects certainly hamper the administration's formulation and conduct of policy on a day-to-day basis, the alternatives may be much worse and the cure more harmful than the disease.

CHAPTER VI

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Friction and its resulting losses in effectiveness, efficiency, and focus is a fact of life in the American political system, not just a phenomenon of the arms control process. But it does seem to be a stronger and more visible feature of arms control than many other government activities. There may be several reasons for this, including:

- o the considerable difference of opinions on how we should proceed with negotiations, or even whether we should be negotiating with the Soviet Union;
- o arms control has taken on the burden of being a measure of the success and stability of the US-Soviet relationship. We want arms control to "succeed" in order to have a stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union;
- o arms control is a relatively new subject with relatively few experts and few successes; and
- o arms control is an emotionally charged subject, stemming from its association with the fear of nuclear war.

Whatever the sources, frictional losses are a significant overhead expense to arms control. As discussed in this paper, the major sources of friction are:

- o media. A perceived liberal bias creates an adversarial relationship with administrations. A sense of the dramatic gives greater media attention to alternatives than to an administration's positions and sometimes even to Soviet

statements and Soviet negotiating positions. Considerable effort must be expended by an administration to get its positions reported in detail, and even more to counter the alternatives that are pressed upon it through the media.

- o non-governmental organizations. While the impact of non-governmental organizations is usually short lived, they can have an intense and effective political impact. The Reagan administration spent months and months countering the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, a group which not only put forth alternatives of their own, but severely criticized the government's approach to the negotiations. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops also became extremely powerful and visible during the preparation of its Pastoral letter. Friction results not only from the need to interact politically with these groups -- the more important effect is its dilution of the strength of our negotiating position. Soviet perceptions of divisiveness at home can only give them hope to continue to be intransigent and wait for political forces in the United States to "soften" the US negotiating position.
- o Congress. An administration's interactions with the Congress consumes an inordinate amount of the time of its negotiators and policy makers. Political posturing by members of Congress often appears to be designed to benefit members at home rather than to further the foreign policy process. A constant stream of alternatives to the US negotiating position dilutes the ability of the administration to concentrate on its own negotiating positions,

visits to the negotiating site takes valuable time away from the negotiators. The "leaks" from Congress create a distrust between the Congress and the administration and can undermine the negotiations themselves.

- o Administration. Friction within the administration itself is equally, if not more, serious. The in-fighting between departments and individuals with diametrically opposed views is debilitating -- it undermines public confidence in the administration, discourages staffs, and results in a loss of time, direction and focus of the negotiations. It results in decisions by the president not being fully implemented, decisions watered down to minimize public dissent by officials, and, occasionally, decisions not taken.

The question at this point would seem to be: how do we fix these problems? How do we remove or reduce these sources of friction? But such questions assume that the frictional losses are all bad, that they are an expense to the arms control process without benefit.

Problems or Dilemmas?

Problems have solutions, dilemmas have horns. (24) Are the effects of friction discussed in this paper problems for which there are solutions, or are they dilemmas which require "a choice between equally undesirable alternatives?" (25) I would submit that we are facing dilemmas, not problems, and one must tread very cautiously in attempting to deal with them.

The concept of a free media is a basic tenet of the Constitution. Despite the disruptions that it can cause in the

negotiating process, this country is not nearly ready to accept enforceable, legal restrictions on the media. And today's media are not about to present only the administration's or even only the US's positions on arms control. We must also recognize that the ultimate arms control act, ratification of a treaty, requires the support of the American people, and that in turn requires the media. In discussing the failure of SALT II, Platt writes that "had the administration ... adopted a more positive and expansive public approach on SALT from the outset, the executive would have been in a far better position later on to move decisively to crystallize this public disposition, mobilize it, and transform it into a potent political force." (23:10) While the administration could probably be more effective in dealing with the media and the media itself could well perform more responsibly, constructively dealing with the media is more a cost of doing business, one that cannot be avoided, than a "problem" for the administration to solve.

The situation is much the same with non-governmental organizations. We cannot do away with them or legislate against their constitutional rights to exist and be active. And we can ignore them only at considerable political risk. Such groups will always exist, and in the view of Weiler, are becoming more and more effective: "A new political base is coming into existence." (11:48) No matter what party is in power, such organizations will offer criticisms and alternatives and will take their case to the public. Generally speaking it would seem that the costs to the system will be less in dealing with their criticisms and ideas openly and immediately, rather than after

they have struck a responsive chord with the Congress or the public.

It is even tougher to think about solving a frictional "problem" with Congress. They share responsibility in the arms control process. Their effectiveness in a positive sense can be limited because of their size and because of the very nature of two-party politics. But again, Congressional involvement is something we would not do away with if we could and the question should be how best to deal with the Congress, not how to cut it out of the process. Platt and Weiler write:

And as staff resources on arms control issues increase both inside and outside the legislative branch; as members of Congress, as a result, become more informed and comfortable with the complexities and trade-offs associated with these issues; as constituents step up the pressure on their elected representatives to spend tax dollars more prudently, including those spent on defense--increased congressional participation in the various aspects of the arms control policymaking process seems inevitable. (15:15-16)

Thus the issue of how to deal most effectively with the Congress is paramount. If an administration chooses to fight, it would seem that the expense to the process will be greater than with continual, positive interactions. "Fighting" with the Congress is apparently what the current administration tried at the outset. The results include such features as the incorporation of "build-down" formally into our negotiating position and the tight linkage between Congressional support for arms control and MX. Most in the administration would have to view these as frictional losses, but perhaps they could have been minimized by a more up-front approach with the Congress early in the administration.

It appears now, however, that the administration has learned its lesson. They are keeping the Congress informed on a weekly basis of the ebb and flow of the negotiations and are considerably more open with them on the development of policy. We can only hope the Congress will do its part by keeping the consultations confidential and presenting a united front to the Soviets.

The issue of whether friction within the administration is a problem or a dilemma is much less clear than with the cases discussed above. Certainly the basic concept of an administration is that of a team, all working toward the goals of the president. And our nature is such that we find it difficult to believe that a president cannot or will not insist upon a smooth working, like-minded team all supporting his stated objectives.

We expect the media to question the administration, we expect special interest groups to organize and press their goals, and we expect our elected representatives to be knowledgeable and active in the most critical issues of the day. But do we expect the president's appointees to quarrel publicly? Do we expect to hear reports of bureaucrats demoralized over constant internal battles? Do we expect to hear such widely differing views on whether we should even be involved in negotiations with the Soviets? Do we expect decisions by the president to be undermined by members of his administration. The answer to these rhetorical questions is, of course, no. We do not expect such actions from within the administration and we wonder why the president does not put a stop to them.

I would argue that the President does not stop such actions because he too is faced with a dilemma, not a problem. Of course

he can stop public and even internal fighting and can demand strict loyalty among his appointees. He need only replace those he finds most difficult with personnel whose views are more nearly his and are more committed to team playing and consensus. There would, of course, be some political cost as he would alienate some members of either the very conservative camp or members of the more moderate camp, but this would likely prove manageable and, after some shaking out, the party would decide it would rather remain intact and in power.

But the loss to the country from such a purge would be far greater than the loss from the administration's internal disagreements. The strength of the current administration's approach is that there is in fact a healthy debate on the correctness of any policy step, and that approaches are examined even after being put into effect. The alternative of only a narrowly focused debate cannot give the president a wide variety of views and alternative courses of action. And unyielding and unquestioning implementation of policy even after circumstances change would not be healthy. The current administration has exactly what it intended to establish, cabinet government, and in my opinion, such an organization's benefits far outweigh its costs. Frictional losses are the price of an informed and continuing questioning of the course of arms control.

This is not to say that there could not be improvements to the current way of doing business. It seems foreign that once a decision is made by the president that he cannot be certain that it will be fully implemented or that he has to read about continuing internal opposition in the media. That degree of

teamwork should not be too much too expect, or to demand. Such actions by appointees are problems, not dilemmas. Solutions exist.

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